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| Version | User | Scope of changes |
|---|---|---|
| Nov 21 2008, 3:00 AM EST (current) | Anonymous | 97 words added |
| Jul 27 2006, 12:24 PM EDT | comelecAKO | 2 words added |
Idea #1: What if the COMELEC were to publish a list of officials who have recently exited from the Commission and made this list available to all advocacy groups. These groups could then use this list as a means of putting the spotlight on ex-coms who show up in the employ of politicians. When an ex-com does pop up as a consultant of a politician, wouldn't these adovcacy groups then know which pols to watch more closely? The theory being close public scrutiny will be a deterrent to monkey-biz.
Idea #2: What if the COMELEC were to impose an adminsitrative rule preventing retirement or separation from the service within 6 months from an electoral exercise? The idea is that people who retire before the 6-month ban comes into effect will not be privy to the security measures that will be put in place for the coming electoral exercise. It is more difficult to corrupt a system that you are not familiar with. A natural limitation of this theory is that ex-coms invariably have a network of friends within the COMELEC who will know what the security measures are, so this idea may not be too workable. But it's an idea and it deserves its 15-seconds of prominence.
Idea #3: What if, instead of making the code of conduct voluntary, the COMELEC makes it a requirement for employment? That would make the code of conduct a contract that - if written correctly - may be enforceable against the ex-com even after he leaves the service. This may not prevent an ex-com from crossing over to the Dark Side, but it will give the COMELEC a means of making him pay for it.
Idea #4: To neutralize the ex-com's network of field officials, what if the COMELEC uses community volunteers for poll clerking duties? This way, the ex-com loses a major part of his operational structure. At the very least, he won't know who the 'bendable' ones are without exposing himself as a corrupter. This coupled with a public listing of all poll-clerk volunteers might generate a significant chilling effect on attempts to defraud elections.
Idea #5: What if the COMELEC were to drastically overhaul the election system administratively? This can probably be done by simplifying counting and canvassing procedures (naturally with notice to all stakeholders) to remove unnecessary discretionary authority from front line election administrators. Corruption thrives best in systems where there are a lot of levels at which discretionary authority can be exercised. Remove excess levels and you lessen the system's vulnerability to corruption.